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RIGHTS OF A MECHANICS' LIENOR IN MISSOURI WHEN THE
IMPROVEMENTS ARE CONTRACTED FOR BY THE LESSEE OR
LICENSEE OF THE LAND
When the fee simple owner of land contracts for the erection
or repair of improvement upon his land, "every mechanic or
other person who shall do or perform any work or labor . or
furnish any materials . . ." may, upon fulfilling the statutory
requirements,1 obtain a lien upon the entire fee simple interest
of the landowner.2 The purpose of this note is to consider what
rights the artisan or materialman acquires when a licensee or
lessee of the premises, not the fee simple owner, contracts for
the improvements. In such a situation, the prospective lienor's
rights will vary.3 In some instances, he will be able to impress a
lien upon the full fee simple interest, just as if he had contracted
with the owner of the reversion directly. In other situations, he
will be able to establish a lien against only the interest of the
lessee or licensee in the premises, and perhaps against the im-
provements themselves also.
WHEN THE REVERSIONARY INTEREST MAY BE
SUBJECTED TO A LIEN
It may be stated as a general proposition that a contractor, can
not, merely by proving the erection, alteration or repair of im-
provements under a contract with the lessee of the land, obtain
a lien upon the reversionary interest. This is true regardless of
whether the reversioner consented to the erection or alteration
of the improvements. 5 Section 429.010 of the Revised Statutes
1. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 429.010-429.430 (1949).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. § 429.010 (1949). See, generally, Creason, The Me-
chanics' Lien, 1 U. oF K.C.L. REv. (No. 2) 4 (1932) ; Daus, Mechanics' Liens
in Missouri, 2 Mo. BAR J. (No. 8) 3 (1931) ; Note, Some Suggested Changes
in the Mechanics' Lien Law of Missouri, 17 U. or K.C.L. Rur'. 130 (1948).
3. For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the lienor has
otherwise satisfied the statutory requirements so that he would be entitled
to a lien upon the full fee simple if he had contracted with the owner of
the premises.
4. The term contractor will be used throughout this paper to denote any
person who, having rendered services or supplied material, could qualify as
a mechanics' lienholder.
5. Mundet Cork.Corp. v. Three Flowers Ice Cream Co., 146 S.W.2d 678(Mo. App. 1940) ; Sol Abrahams & Sons Const. Co. v. Osterholm, 136 S.W.2d
36 (1.o. App. 1940); Cochran v. Johnston, 25 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. App. 1930);
Lepage v. Laux, 211 S.W. 898 (Mo. App. 1919); Philip Carey Co. v. Keller-
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of Missouri (1949), which is the section giving a lien upon the
totality of interest in a piece of land, requires that the contract
for improvements have been made with "the owner or proprietor
thereof, or his agent, trustee, contractor or sub-contractor." Of
course, if, upon general principles of agency, the lessee can be
found to have been constituted the agent of the lessor for the
purpose of making the improvements, the interest of the lessor
will be subject to a lien., But the mere relation of landlord and
tenant does not create such an agency.7
However, it will be noted that Section 429.010 specifically pro-
vides that a contract made with the "agent" of the owner will
give rise to a lien upon the owner's interest. The Missouri courts
have, at least in verbalizing the results reached, attached great
significance to this express mention of the word "agent" in the
statute. They have pointed out that upon ordinary principles of
construction, if a contract were made with one who would, under
normal agency principles, be considered an agent of the owner,
the courts would deem this in sub'stance a contract with the
owner and find the contractor entitled to a lien. For this reason,
they have said that the legislature must have intended something
more when specifically inserting the word "agent." Hence, the
Missouri courts have evolved the doctrine that even though the
man Contracting Co., 185 Mo. App. 346, 170 S.W. 449 (1914); Marty v.
Hippodrome Amusement Co., 173 Mo. App. 707, 160 S.W. 26 (1913).
6. Ehrhardt Bros. Decorating Co. v. Columbia Candy Co., 186 S.V. 1113(Mo. App. 1916). The necessary agency may arise upon the usual grounds
of apparent authority or estoppel. Dean &, Hancock v. O'Bryan, 290 S.W.
641 (Mo. App. 1927).
In one instance where there was a quite obvious scheme on the part of the
owner to avoid paying for the improvements which it wished made, the
Missouri Supreme Court quite readily looked through the scheme and held
the fee subject to a lien. The defendant, a closely held corporation, owned
premises containing an abandoned, partially completed building. The de-
fendant leased the premises for ninety-nine years to another corporation
which it had created, the stockholders of the second, meagerly financed cor-
poration owning shares in substantially the same proportion that they did
in the original corporation. The second corporation had the building com-
pleted and then defaulted on its indebtedness to the contractor. It also
forfeited its lease to the parent corporation the immediate right to the im-
provements thus reverting to the fee simple owner. It was held that al-
though there was no requirement in the lease that the second corporation
complete the building, since the defendant's shareholders, who dominated
the second corporation, had intended to achieve erection of the building at
the expense of only their limited investment in the second corporation, the
second corporation should be held the agent of the first within the meaning
of Section 429.010. Winslow Bros. Co. v. McCully Stone Mason Co., 169 Mo.
236, 69 S.W. 304 (1902).
7. See note 5 supra.
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lessor does not expressly authorize the lessee to erect improve-
ments on the lessor's behalf, if the lessor requires, as a condition
of making the lease, that the lessee obligate himself to make
improvements of a substantial and permanent nature, the re-
versioner constitutes the lessee his agent for the purpose of sub-
jecting the reversioner's interest to a mechanics' lien.8 This rule
holds true even though the lessee is not deemed the agent of the
lessor for the purpose of subjecting him to personal liability.
Obviously, then, the doctrine evolved by the courts has little re-
lation to the ordinary principles of agency. It is a special, limited
agency which the court purportedly finds suggested in the statute,
although the lessor never intends that the lessee should be con-
stituted his agent nor indulges in any acts which would make
third parties believe that he had such an intention. In one of the
leading cases, it was said:
Appellant insists that the 'agent' mentioned in the statute
must be a person whose agency is sufficient in its scope to
bind the owner personally for the price of the labor or mate-
rials furnished. We are unable to agree with this contention.
The purpose of the mechanic's lien act is not to create a
personal indebtedness not otherwise existing, but its sole
purpose is to provide a lien under conditions enumerated.'
The court alluded to the fact that, if the lessee were, upon ordi-
nary principles, an agent of the lessor so as to make him liable
personally, there was no necessity to specifically mention this
situation in the statute. It then said:
We, therefore, conclude that the 'agent' mentioned in the
statute may be a person with such limited authority as to be
unable to bind his principal personally for the work, but who
at the same time by an exercise of limited authority given
will transmit to the person furnishing the materials a right
to a lien on the o-ner's premises. Such a relationship is very
similar to the agency of the contractor who contracts with
the owner to do the work."
Whether the legislature intended that such significance be at-
8. Allen Estate Ass'n v. Fred Boeke & Son, 300 Mo. 575, 254 S.W. 858(1923); Ward v. Nolde, 259 Mo. 285, 168 S.W. 596 (1914); American Sash
& Door Co. v. Stein, 231 Mo. App. 221, 96 S.W.2d 927 (1936); Concrete
Engineering Co. v. Grande Bldg. Co., 230 Mo. App. 443, 86 S.W.2d 595(1935); Weis & Jennett Marble Co. v. Rossi, 198 Mo. App. 35, 198 S.W. 424
(1917); Nicol Heating & Plumbing Co. v. J. B. Neevel & Sons Const. Co.,
187 Mo. App. 584, 174 S.W. 161 (1915).
9. Ward v. Nolde, 259 Mo. 286, 298, 168 S.W. 597, 599 (1914).
10. Id. at 298, 168 S.W. at 600.
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tached to its use of the word "agent" is quite doubtful. How-
ever, the doctrine of the lessee's being able to subject the rever-
sionary interest to a lien when required to improve, although not
expressly empowered to act as an agent, has become firmly estab-
lished in Missouri. This result is in accordance with the tendency
of the courts to consider the mechanics' lien law as remedial and
to construe it liberally. And the fact that the legislature has
taken no steps to alter this construction by the courts, although it
has frequently amended other portions of the act, may be deemed
an indication of legislative satisfaction with the interpretation
placed upon it by the courts.
The usual situation in which the court will find the limited
agency relationship necessary for subjecting the fee to a lien
occurs when the lessor specifically exacts of the lessee a covenant,
contained in the lease, according to which the lessee obligates
himself to make improvements of a substantial and permanent
nature."1 The improvement required may be the erection of an
entirely new building,1 2 or the substantial alteration of, remodel-
ling of, or addition to, an existing structure." But the improve-
ment must be substantial and permanent. That language is re-
peated in every case.
It is not altogether clear what amounts to a "substantial and
permanent improvement," however. It is clear, on the one hand,
that merely requiring the lessee to keep the premises in the state
of repair which existed when they were leased to him will not
subject the reversionary interest to a mechanics' lien. 4 And, on
the other hand, it is apparent that the construction of a totally
new building would equal a substantial and permanent improve-
ment.25 The difficulty arises when the lessee is required to re-
model or alter an existing building in some manner.
11. See note 8 supra.
12. Allen Estate Ass'n v. Fred Boeke & Son, 300 Mo. 575, 254 S.W. 858
(1923); Arthur Morgan Trucking Co. v. Shartzer, 237 Mo. App. 535, 174
S.W.2d 226 (1943); Nicol Heating & Plumbing Co. v. J. B. Neevel & Sons
Const. Co., 187 Mo. App. 584, 174 S.W. 161 (1915).
13. Ward v. Nolde, 259 Mo. 286, 168 S.W. 597 (1914) ; American Sash &
Door Co. v. Stein, 231 Mo. App. 221, 96 S.W.2d 927 (1936); Weis & Jennett
Marble Co. v. Rossi, 198 Mo. App. 35, 198 S.W. 424 (1917).
.14. McGuinn v. Federated Mines & Milling Co., 160 Mo. App. 28, 141 S.W.
467 (1911).
15. There may, of course, be instances in which a totally new structure
of a very temporary nature may be erected, but the normal building will
be one of a permanent nature and, of course, a substantial improvement.
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The earlier decisions of the courts of appeals indicated that
the improvement had to be of such a nature that it would be of
benefit to the lessor at the expiration of the lease, when he would
regain control of the premises. 6 It was thought that, if the im-
provements would be so deteriorated at the termination of the
lease that the market value of the premises when they reverted
to the lessor would not be enhanced by virtue of the installation
of the improvements, they were to be deemed for the benefit of
the lessee only and it would be unjust to hold the property of the
lessor accountable for their cost. This premise was expressed in
Dierks & Sons Lumber Co. v. Morris,27 where the defendant had
leased a three story building for ninety-nine years. Although
the lessee had covenanted to expend at least $5000 for additions
and alterations to the building, it was pointed out that the effect
of these improvements would probably be gone, through physical
decay, before the end of the ninety-nine year lease. The Kansas
City Court of Appeals said:
* . . in order to make such covenant constitute an agency
between the lessor and lessee we are necessarily bound to
look at the facts to determine whether there was.an agency
or not. If on account of the shortness of the lease, the extent,
cost and character of the improvements, or other facts in
evidence ... it can be seen that the improvement is really
for the benefit of the lessor and that he is having the work
done through the lessee, then it can be said with justice that
the lessee in such case is acting for the lessor. But if the
facts do not show this, it would seem untenable to say that
the mere inclusion in a lease of a covenant to improve and
repair on the part of the lessee will create a relation of
agency between the tenant and the landlord. s
However, a year later the Missouri Supreme Court, without
very much discussion, seemed to adopt a more liberal attitude
in deciding what was a substantial and permanent improvement."
It had no difficulty finding that the making of $20,000 worth of
alterations upon a five story building under a twenty year lease
was a substantial and permanent change. Although this later
Supreme Court case is distinguishable from the Dierks Lumber
16. Dierks & Sons Lumber Co. v. Morris, 170 Mo. App. 212, 156 S.W. 75
(1913); Pickel Marble & Granite Co. v. The Apollo Turkish Bath Co., 85
Mo. App. 313 (1900). But .,ee Curtin-Clark Hdw. Co. v. Churchill, 126 Mo.
App. 462, 104 S.W. 476 (1907).
17. 170 Mo. App. 212, 156 S.W. 75 (1913).
18. Id. at 219, 156 S.W. at 77.
19. Ward v. Nolde, 259 Mo. 286, 168 S.W. 597 (1914).
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Co. case in that the lease was for a shorter period and the altera-
tions more extensive, the ease with which the Supreme Court
found the improvements to satisfy the test indicates that the
court would not be very strict in requiring the plaintiff to show
that the improvements satisfied the definition.2 0
Then, in 1923, the Missouri Supreme Court clearly indicated
that its definition of a substantial improvement was something
which amounted to more than a mere repair by the lessee to keep
the premises in the condition that existed when he acquired pos-
session of the property, and that by permanent was meant merely
that the improvements have an effect that would continue for
some appreciable period of time, although not necessarily beyond
the period of the lease.2 1 Its statement was not a mere dictum
because the lease in that case was to run for ninety-nine years.
The court said that if the improvements met the above definition
of substantial and permanent, there was in effect a conclusive
presumption of a benefit to the reversioner:
These improvements having been made under the supervision
of the lessor with a view of improving the property . . . it
is immaterial as a matter of fact whether the owner was
ultimately benefited by the transaction. . . it is unneces-
sary to discuss the contention as to the effect of the improve-
ments on the property at the end of the lease; or whether or
not despite the improvements the lessor is now receiving
a return from the property. 22
One of the factors that the court had in mind in holding that it
was immaterial whether the improvements would survive the
ninety-nine year lease involved was that the lease might be for-
feited considerably sooner, whereupon the reversioner would have
the immediate benefit of the improvements.
'Earlier, the Kansas City Court of Appeals had used similar
language indicating an almost conclusive presumption of sub-'
stantial benefit to the reversioner.2 3 It was answering a conten-
tion that the mere conversion of the property from adaptability
20. Following the Ward decision, the St. Louis Court of Appeals found
that $110 worth of marble, wainscoting required by the lessor for decorating
a waiting room was a substantial improvement. Weis & Jennett Marble Co.
v. Rossi, 198 Mo. App. 35, 198 S.W. 424 (1917).
21. Allen Estate Ass'n v. Fred Boeke & Son, 300 Mo. 575, 254 S.W. 858
(1923). •
22. I& at 591, 254 S.W. at 862.
23. Curtin-Clark Hdw. Co. v. Churchill, 126 Mo. App. 462, 104 S.W. 476
(1907).
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for one use to another did not necessarily indicate an increase in
the market value of the property, and that hence the contractor
should be required to prove that the value of the premises had
been increased by their alteration. That court said:
: . . the right of the materialmen and laborers to liens . . .
is not affected by the fact that the owner has derived no
pecuniary benefit from the improvement. . .. An improve-
ment must be held to be a betterment when it places the
premises in the condition the owner would have them.
2
'
Thus, the rule today seems to be that when the lessor requires
an express promise on the part of the lessee to do more than keep
the premises in ordinary repair the type of improvement neces-
sary to subject the reversionary interest to a mechanics' lien will
be found to have been required. This rule is founded principally
upon the theory that if the lessor found it desirable to exact a
covenant to improve from his tenant, he must have deemed such
improvements of benefit to himself. And since the true basis for
the doctrine of implied agency seems to be a feeling on the part
of the courts that the landlord should not be able to derive a bene-
fit from improvements which he compels to be placed upon his
property without at least his property being liable therefor
(despite any verbalizations the court may make as to the signifi-
cance of the word "agent" in the statute), this rule seems quite
sound.
As was indicated above, the usual case in which an implied
agency is found is that in which the lessor exacts a promise from
the lessee that he will improve the premises. However, the Mis-
souri courts have extended this doctrine beyond the instances of
express compulsion. If the court should find that the tenant was
in effect required by the reversioner to improve, this finding
has the same effect as an express compulsion upon the tenant.
This situation arises where the premises are leased for a speci-
fied purpose only, and this purpose is one for which the premises
are not suited in their existing condition. The reversioner is
then said to compel the tenant to make the changes, for his only
alternative would be to forfeit his lease.
This extension of the doctrine was first set forth in a case de-
24. Id. at 470, 104 S.W. at 478. Accord: American Sash & Door Co. v.
Stein, 231 Mo. App. 221, 96 S.W.2d 927 (1936).
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cided by the Kansas City Court of Appeals. 2 The defendant had
leased an old hotel for ten years. Although no improvements
were specifically required of the lessee, it was stipulated in the
lease that the *premises were to be used as a theater only, and per-
mission was given the tenant to make such alterations as might
be necessary to make the premises suitable for this purpose. The
lessee made alterations, such as the installation of a box office, at
a cost of $20,000. In holding the reversionary interest of the
lessor liable for these improvements, the court said:
From the record before us it appears that the lessee was to
use the premises for theater purposes alone. In their condi-
tion they were unsuited for such use and when converted
into a theater they could be used for nothing else. In effect
the lessor burdened the lessee with the obligation to make
and pay for the necessary alterations. That it intended to
derive a substantial benefit therefrom is evidenced by the
fact that instead of requiring, at the end of the tenancy, the
restoration of the premises in the condition they were in
when leased, the improvements were to pass to the landlord.
It was to receive a theater for a hotel. Evidently the meta-
morphysis accomplished at such great expense was for its
'benefit as well as that of the termor.26
This doctrine was adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in
a' case decided in 1934 involving similar facts. 27 That court said
that despite the fact that a lease of an auto repair shop contained
no covenant for improvements, the fact that it did say !'the build-
ing to be used for the purpose of a picture show house" and "the
lessee has permission to make any changes his business requires"
created a requirement of improvements by necessary implication.
From this point on, the rule seems clear that when the premises
are leased for a specified purpose and they are not in a condition
to be used for that purpose so that substantial remodelling is
necessarily imposed upon the lessee if he is to make the proper
use of the leased property, the case will be treated in the same
manner as one in which a covenant to improve has been exacted
by the lessor.28
25. Dougherty-Moss Lumber Co. v. Churchill, 114 Mo. App. 578, 90 S.W.
405 (1905).
26. Id. at 584, 90 S.W. at 406.
27. Masterson v. Roberts, 336 Mo. 158, 78 S.W.2d 856 (1934).
28. The earlier courts of appeals cases of Martin-Welch Hdw. Co. v.
Moor, 16 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. App. 1929); and Mlarty v. Hippodrome Amuse-
ment Co., 173 Mo. App. 707, 160 S.W. 26 (1913) appear to have been over-
ruled by the Masterson decision. In the latter case an old ear barn had been
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This extension of the doctrine of implied agency has merit, if
the original basis of the implied agency to encumber (though not
to render personally liable) is sound. If this basis be that the
reversioner should not be permitted to benefit, without having
his land subject to liability, from improvements which he has
compelled another to make, there is as much reason for subject-
ing his interest to a lien when the improvements are "impliedly"
required as when they are expressly so. But this doctrine is
limited. The rule today remains that unless the reversioner some-
how compels the tenant to make improvements, the lessor's in-
terest will not be held. Thus if there is no covenant to improve
and the premises are in a condition generally suitable for the
business of the lessee (as a theater building leased for theater
purposes), the mere fact that the premises may be somewhat run
down and rehabilitation of the premises desirable to make them
more suitable will not create an implied agency. If the lessee
could use the premises in their existing condition, although they
would not be very satisfactory without some alterations, there is
no compulsion upon him to make the improvements. Contractors
have contended that when the lease provided that such permitted
improvements were to revert at the end of the term and that they
should be made in accordance with specifications approved by
the lessor, he was obviously intending to benefit from them and
accordingly his interest should be rendered liable. However, the
Missouri courts have rejected this contention, holding that such
cases involved no more than a mere permission by the reversioner
to make improvements if the lessee so desired. 2
9
The amount for which the lien attaches will, of course, be only
the cost of those improvements which the lessor either impliedly
rented to the lessee for five years "for amusement purposes only." And
although the the lease contained no promise on the part of the lessee to
improve, it did state "the lessee intends to remodel and improve said premises
at his own expense at an estimated cost of eight thousand dollars [Italics
added]." Nevertheless, the Kansas City Court of Appeals held that there
was no evidence that the lessor had constituted the lessee his agent for the
purpose of burdening the reversion with a mechanics' lien.
29. Sol Abrahams & Sons v. Osterholm, 136 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. App. 1940);
Philip Carey Co. v. Kellerman Contracting Co., 185 Mo. App. 346, 170 S.W.
449 (1914). In the latter case the reversioner had agreed to reimburse the
lessee for one-half the cost of the improvements made, if the lessee chose
to make them. It was held that although the contractor might be subrogated
to the claim of the tenant against his lessor for one-half of the cost, this
fact did not create a lien in favor of the contractor. See also Armstrong
Cork Co. v. Merchants' Refrigerating Co., 184 Fed. 199 (8th Cir. 1910).
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or expressly required. Thus where certain specified improve-
ments which would cost "about $20,000" were installed at a cost
of $22,000, but the lessee also contracted for "extras" not speci-
fied in the lease, notably a sprinkler system costing $7000, the
amount of the lien upon the reversion was set at $22,000.30 The
important consideration is not the amount of expenditure re-
quired in the lease (if a figure is specified), but rather whether
the impiovement which forms the basis of the contractor's claim
is one which was required in the lease. Thus where the lessor
had required a number of alterations upon the property, but the
only improvement placed thereon by the plaintiff seeking a lien
was a heating plant, which was not among the required improve-
ments, the plaintiff was held not entitled to a lien.31 In those
instances where the improvements were not expressly required
but implied from the circumstances of the case, there has not been
much indication of exactly what improvements may form the
basis of the lien. Presumably, the cost of any improvements
deemed necessary to make the premises suitable for the tenant's
particular use might be included in the amount of the lien.
3 2
Lessors have, at times, attempted to prevent the application of
a lien to their freehold by spelling out in the lease that the lessee
was not to be considered as having any authority to contract on
behalf of the lessor. That these efforts have been unsuccessful,3
illustrates the unusual character of this agency relationship, for
the lessor, despite his express declarations to the contrary, finds
himself forced to accept the tenant as his agent for the limited
purpose of subjecting the reversion to a lien. Since the lessor is
held even though he does nothing to give third parties the im-
pression that the lessee is authorized to act for him, these results
30. Word v. Nolde, 259 Mo. 285, 168 S.W. 596 (1914).
31. Powell v. Reidinger, 234 S.W. 850 (Mo. App. 1921).
32. Cf. Dougherty-Moss Lumber Co. v. Churchill, 114 Mo. App. 578, 90
S.W. 405 (1905).
33. Allen Estate Ass'n v. Fred Boeke & Son, 300 Mo. 575, 254 S.W. 858(1923); Concrete Engineering Co. v. Grande Bldg. Co., 230 Mo. App. 443,
86 S.W.2d 595 (1935). There may be some basis for saying that in a close
case in which the court is undecided whether the requisites for finding an
agency are present, the disclaimer clause may be of some benefit to the
reversioner. See Marty v. Hippodrome Amusement Co., 173 Mo. App. 707,
160 S.W. 26 (1913); Dierks & Sons Lumber Co. v. Morris, 170 Mo. App.
212, 156 S.W. 75 (1913). In each of these cases, where the requisites of an
agency might have been found but were not, a disclaimer clause was present.
However, the non-existence of the lien was not expressly placed upon this
ground.
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cannot be justified on the usual principles of apparent authority.
Moreover, to a contention that when the lessor had duly recorded
a lease containing such a disclaimer provision, the contractor had
notice of it and acquiesced in the provision, the Kansas City Court
of Appeals replied that the liens are not a consensual matter-'
they are purely statutory.3'
It should be pointed out that in order to bind the interest of the
lessor under the agency doctrine engrafted onto Section 429.010,
he need not be the fee simple owner of the premises, although
that will, of course, be the usual case. As was indicated in Sea-
man v. Paddock,35 the interest against which Section 429.010
creates a lien is that of the "owner or proprietor." And a later
section provides that any person for whose immediate benefit any
building or other improvement may be made should be deemed
the "owner or proprietor" for the purposes of the mechanics'
lien statute.36 In those situations where an agency relationship
is found, the erection of the improvement will be said to have been
for the immediate benefit of the reversioner. Thus the reversion-
ary interest that is bound may be a life estate,37 or one for years.3 8
Of course, in the above situations if the holder of the ultimate
reversionary interest in fee simple does not require the improve-
ments, his interest will not be held.3 9 But if he does require the
original lessee of the premises to erect improvements, and that
lessee then sub-lets to another who executes a similar covenant
to the lessee, so that it is the sub-lessee who actually contracts for
the improvements, this fact will not insulate the fee simple in-
terest from liability."0 The reversionary interest is being benefited
34. Concrete Engineering Co. v. Grande Bldg. Co., 230 Mo. App. 443, 86
S.W.2d 595 (1935). Cf. Center Creek Mining Co. v. Coyne, 164 Mo. App. 492,
147 S.W. 148 (1912).
35. 51 Mo. App. 465 (1892).
36. Mo. REv. STAT. § 429.150 (1949). Cf. Rogers Foundry Co. v. Squires,
221 Mo. App. 17, 297 S.W. 470 (1927).
37. Masterson v. Roberts, 336 Mo. 158, 78 S.W.2d 856 (1934).
38. Arthur Morgan Trucking Co. v. Shartzer, 237 Mo. App. 535, 174
S.W.2d 226 (1943). Mo. REV STAT. § 429.070 (2) (1949) employs language
similar to that of § 429.010 in saying that a contract by the agent of a lessee
will subject the lessee's interest to a lien. Presumably a requirement by
the lessee that his sub-lesse substantially improve might be held to con-
stitute the sub-lessee an agent of the lessee under the same theory as that
applied to § 429.010. See Miners Lumber Co. v. Miller, 117 S.W.2d 711
(Mo. App. 1938).
39. Masterson v. Roberts, 336 Mo. 158, 78 S.W.2d 856 (1934).
40. Arthur Morgan Trucking Co. v. Shartzer, 237 Mo. App. 535, 174
S.W.2d 226 (1943).
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in such a situation, for the lessee has merely delegated to an-
other the duty of contracting for the required improvements."1
RIGHTS OF THE CONTRACTOR WHEN HE IS UNABLE TO SUBJECT
THE REVERSIONARY INTEREST TO A LIEN
Even though the contractor may be unable to subject the entire
fee simple interest of the lessor to a mechanics' lien, he is not
remediless when he contracts with the lessee for improvements.
Section 429.070 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (1949) gives
other remedies to the prospective lienor42 This section provides
that when the contractor places a building or other improvement
upon the land at the request of the lessee, the contractor may
have a lien upon the improvement itself and the lessee's interest
in the premises. Of course, these rights will never be as valuable
as a claim upon the entire fee simple interest in both the land and
the improvements thereon, particularly because the lessee's in-
terest in the premises may be worth little. The lessee will fre-
quently be in default in his rent to the lessor, and even if he is
not in arrears, if he merely pays from month to month, the con-
tractor will have a claim only to the unexpired part of a month's
occupation of the premises. Nevertheless, the lien of the con-
tractor upon those improvements which he has installed may be
quite valuable.
Prior to an amendment to the mechanics' lien law in 1901, such
rights were accorded the contractor only if the person with whom
he contracted had a leasehold interest, as distinguished from a
mere license to use the premises. A good deal of litigation
formerly arose to determine whether the contracting party was
a lessee or licensee, the problem being particularly acute when
the interest which the contracting party acquired was one for
41. An additional point which is perhaps self-evident, is that there must
be a tenurial relationship between the owner of the premises and the person
who contracts for the improvement if there is to be any possibility of a
lien upon the fee simple. In Badger Lumber Co. v. Stepp, 157 Mo. 366 57
S.W. 1059 (1900), the defendant, the owner of a lot and two story building
thereon, granted a lodge the privilege of adding a third story to her building
which it might use as a meeting place. It was held that the lodge was the
owner in fee simple of the third story, and hence there was no possible basis
for subjecting the independent fee simple interest of the defendant to a
lien for the lodge's debt incurred in erecting the third floor.
42. For a striking instance of how other remedies of the mechanics' lien
act may help the contractor when he is unable to perfect his lien against
the fee, see Philip Gruner & Bros. Lumber Co. v. Jones, 71 Mo. App. 110(1897).
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mining purposes. 3 That difficulty no longer exists, for the statute
now uses such terms as "property furnished or placed on licensed
or leased lots" and "under or by virtue of any contract or account
with the owner or proprietor of the license or lease."" Hence, it
appears today that, if the party contracting for the improvements
has any sort of right to the use of the premises, he is in a position
to subject the improvements installed and his own interest in the
land to a mechanics' lien. 5
An even more important change in the ability of the contractor
to secure a mechanics' lien upon the improvements installed and
the tenant's interest in the premises was made in 1911. Prior to
that time, the Missouri courts had interpreted the mechanics'
lien act as giving a lien upon improvements installed by the lessee
and his leasehold interest only if the improvements became realty
as between the landlord and tenant. Although the statute prior
to 1911 did not by its wording expressly dictate that result, the
courts felt this was its meaning, and much litigation arose in de-
termining whether the improvements became realty or remained
personalty as between the lessor and lessee.46 This doctrine fre-
quently meant that the contractor would be entitled to no lien of
any kind, because there is a definite tendency to find that a par-
ticular improvement remains personalty when the issue arises
between the landlord and his tenant. For example, whenever the
materials installed were found to be "trade fixtures," the im-
provement was deemed personalty and hence there was no lien.4'
43. See, for example, Rogers v. C.C.C. Mining Co., 75 Mo. App. 114
(1898); Buchannan v. Cole, 57 Mo. App. 11 (1894).
44. Mo. REV. STAT. § 429.070 (1949).
45. Joplin Supply Co. v. West, 149 Mo. App. 78, 130 S.W. 156 (1910).
As early as 1892, it had been determined that a tenancy from month to
month was a sufficient interest in the lessee to give the contractor a claim
upon the improvements installed. Deatherage v. Sheidley, 50 Mo. App. 490.
The early holding in Squires v. Fithian's Adm'r, 27 Mo. 134 (1858), that
a contract with a tenant at will would not entitle the contractor to a lien
upon the improvements installed seems to have been changed by the lan-
guage of the statute. A tenant at will would seem to be the holder of at
least a revocable license to be upon the premises.
46. See, for example, Springfield Foundry & Machine Co. v. Cole, 130
Mo. 1, 31 S.W. 922 (1895); Richardson v. Koch, 81 Mo. 264 (1883);
Haeussler v. Missouri Glass Co., 52 Mo. 452 (1873); Ottumwa Iron Works
v. Muir, 126 Mo. App. 582, 105 S.W. 29 (1907). At a very early date there
was a special mechanics' lien law for St. Louis County which did allow a
lien upon improvements which remained personalty between the lessor and
lessee. Koenig v. Mueller, 39 Mo. 165 (1866).
47. Armstrong Cork Co. v. Merchants' Refrigerating Co., 184 Fed. 199(8th Cir. 1910); Collins & Holliday v. Mott, 45 Mo. 100 (1869); Carroll
v. Shooting the Chutes Co., 85 Mo. App. 563 (1900). The early attitude of
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The main reason given by the courts for this result was that they
did not believe the legislature thought it necessary to give a con-
tractor a lien upon improvements which remained personalty.
They believed that those security devices available to persons
asserting interests in chattels could give ample protection to the
lienor.48
However, the legislature amended the mechanics' lien act in
1911 to make it quite clear that the lien might attach regardless
of whether as between landlord against tenant the improvement
remained personalty. As the statute now reads, no other holding
is possible. After spelling out a list of things upon which liens
may be obtained, such as boilers and pumps, the statute says,
"and other personal property . . furnished or placed on li-
censed or leased lots shall, regardless of whether or not the owner
of the license or lease has the right thereunder to remove the
same or other personal property from such licensed or leased
premises during or at the end of the term thereof. . ..,9 Hence,
since the passage of this amendment, the Missouri courts have
held that property which, either by express agreement or impli-
cation remains personalty as between the lessor and lessee is
nevertheless lienable.50 Of course, this does not obviate the neces-
sity that the improvement installed be sufficiently identified with
the freehold so as to become lienable within the requirements of
the mechanics' lien law.51 That problem is common to all
mechanics' lien cases and beyond the scope of this note. It may
briefly be stated, however, that whereas in the test between land-
lord and tenant all presumptions and doubts are resolved in favor
of the materiars remaining personalty, quite the opposite is
true in the mechanics' lien cases, so that almost anything identi-
the courts is illustrated by the following quotation, "1... our law holds
real estate, as property, in the highest sense. It operates upon that which
is permanent, and wastes no energy on the floating and precarious tenure
of chattel interests. . . . It has uniformly been held that the building,
erection, or improvement, in order to be reached by the lien, must have be-
come part of the real estate, unless a different interest [sic] is clearly
expressed in the statute." McMahon v. Vickery, 4 Mo. App. 225, 229 (1877).
48. See particularly the statement in John O'Brien Boiler Works Co. v.
Haydock, 59 Mo. App. 653 (1894).
49. Mo. REv. STAT. § 429.070 (1) (1949).
50. Forest Lumber Co. v. Osceola Lead & Zinc Mining Co., 222 S.W. 398(Mo. 1920); Raithel v. Hamilton-Schmidt Surgical Co., 48 S.W.2d 79 (Mo.
App. 1932); Landreth Machinery Co. v. Roney, 185 Mo. App. 474, 171
S.W. 681 (1914).
51. See, for example, Woodling v. Westport Hotel Operating Co., 227
Mo. App. 1231. 63 S.W.2d 207 (1933).
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fled with the realty is lienable. Thus it will be seen that the
above amendment has greatly extended the relief available to
mechanics and material men who contract with the lessee only.
The mechanics' lien act as enacted by the legislature formerly
provided that if the lessee contracted for repairs or alterations
upon a building which had previously been placed upon the land
by the lessor and was owned by him, the contractor might have a
lien upon the owner's fee simple interest in the building (al-
though not the land), even though the lessor had not required
the improvement so as to bring the case within the doctrine previ-
ously discussed. It did not matter whether the lessee had per-
mission to make the repair nor how extensive it was. Thus if
the lessee decided, upon his own initiative, to make repairs upon
a building owned by the lessor, the contractor secured a lien
upon the entire building.52 In 1934 the Missouri Supreme Court
held this part of the mechanics' lien statute unconstitutionaL5
It declared that to subject a reversioner's interest in a building
to a lien merely because the lessee had decided to "reconstruct,
alter, or repair" the building, though not required to do so by the
lessor, nor even permitted to do so, was to deprive the rever-
sioner of his property without due process of law. Although the
facts of the case in which the unconstitutionality was declared
were slightly unusual in that the fee simple interest in the build-
ing was really owned by remaindermen, the life tenant having
leased to the lessee who contracted for the improvements, the
court used broad language saying that entire portion of the
statute was unconstitutional. The case has been treated as com-
pletely eliminating that portion of the statute giving a lien upon
the entire building without regard to whether the lessor gave his
permission to repair, although the case might be limited on its
facts.5" Thus the contractor no longer can, by virtue of merely
doing some work upon a building, or installing an improvement
therein, acquire a lien upon the entire building if it is owned by
the lessor, not the lessee. Although the compilers of the Missouri
Revised Statutes of 1939 left the wording of the act stand as it
52. Martin-Welch Hdw. Co. v. Moor 16 S W 2d 667 (Mo. App. 1929),
cert. denied, State ex reL Harrington I May v. Trinble, 326 Mo. 623, 31
S.W.2d 783 (1930).
53. Masterson v. Roberts, 336 Mo. 158, 78 S.W.2d 856 (1934).
54. Mundet Cork Corp. v. Three Flowers Ice Cream Co., 146 S.W.2d 678
(Mo. App. 1940).
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was enacted by the legislature, the compilers of the 1949 Statutes
altered the wording of the objectionable sections to conform to
the Supreme Court's decision. Whereas the act originally read,
"Every mechanic . . . who shall do or perform any work or
labor upon or furnish, place, or repair any building... fixture
or other personal property" shall have a lien thereon,"' the act
now reads "Every mechanic . . who shall erect or construct
any building ... fixture . . .or other personal property .. •
[Italics added]."' Thus the fact that the lienor has a claim to
only those improvements which he himself places upon the land
is emphasized by the changed wording. It indicates that the re-
visors also understood the decision to eliminate the entire portion
pertaining to liens upon the whole building resulting from mere
repair, without regard to whether the reversioner gave his per-
mission to repair.
Of course, it is still specifically provided that if the contractor
places such materials as an "engine, pump, boiler, belting, pulley,
shafting, machinery" within a building owned by the lessor, the
contractor has a lien upon such material and may have it sold and
removed. Moreover, if the building itself is an entirely new one
erected by the lessee, the contractor may then have a lien upon
the entire building. The decisions upon that point57 have not been
overruled. And the contractor may have a claim upon the lease-
hold in both the building and ground in any event, whatever they
may be worth to him. 8
In addition, if the building is one owned by the lessee, a con-
tractor who does not participate in the original construction, but
merely repairs or otherwise does work upon it later will never-
theless be entitled to a lien upon the whole building plus the
leasehold interest in the ground. Section 429.070 (3) of the
statute specifically retains the "repair" or "perform any work or
labor upon" language in saying that the contractor may have a
claim against the property of the lessee himself when he has
contracted with him. Thus where the contractor installed a
sprinkler system in a building standing upon leased ground but
55. Mo. REV STAT. § 3550 (1939).
56. Mo. Rsv. STAT. § 429.070 (1949).
57. Allen v. Sales, 56 Mo. 28 (1874); Julius Seidel Lumber Co. v. Hy-
draulic Press Brick Co., 288 S.W. 979 (Mo. App. 1926); House Wrecking,
Salvage & Lumber Co. v. Gartrell, 204 S.W. 52 (Mo. App. 1918).
58. Miners Lumber Co. v. Miller, 117 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. App. 1938).
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owned by the lessee, he was allowed a lien upon the lessee's total
interest in the building.5'
Nevertheless, despite those possible situations in which the
contractor may be almost as well off as before the decision in
Masterson v. Roberts, there are other situations in which he will
be left with rights which are almost valueless. Thus when the
improvement which he installs is a fixture such as machinery
which can be easily removed in a resalable condition, he still has
a valuable right, but if he merely repairs an existing building,
performing such acts as painting it, refitting its doors, and the
like, he has no improvements which he can remove and sell. Simi-
larly, even though he installs something which is an entity in
itself (as distinguished from paint which is spread all over the
building) it may be so integrated with the lessor's building that
the court will not permit it to be separated therefrom. Thus in
one instance where the lessee had built an addition onto a pre-
existing building owned by the lessor, the removal of this addi-
tion by the contractor was enjoined since it would have caused
irreparable injury to the freehold b5 leaving one side of the
lessor's building standing completely open.6 o There has been very
little discussion or decision upon the point of what is a removable
improvement in these situations. Since the statute gives the
right to sell and remove in absolute terms, we may infer that the
lessor would have to rely upon equitable principles to prevent
removal and thus demonstrate that irreparable injury, not mere
injury, to the freehold would occur before removal would be
prevented. The courts would also be inclined to favor the con-
tractor since he has no other adequate remedy, and would let him
remove if at all possible, making him liable for damages for any
injury he may inflict when removing. Nevertheless, there will be
instances, such as the one cited above, in which removal will be
prevented, and in those instances the contractor will have no
more than a claim to the leasehold interest of the lessor.
As previously pointed out, this claim of the lienor to the lease-
hold or license interest will seldom be of much value. Usually, the
lessee will not have paid the rent very far in advance and fre-
quently will have forfeited the lease for non-payment of rent.
59. Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Stephens, 306 Mo. 518, 267 S.W. 888(1924).
co. Orear v. Dierks Lumber Co., 188 Mo. App. 729, 176 S.W. 467 (1915).
Cf. Seidel v. Bloeser, 77 Mo. App. 172 (1898).
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Although even in this latter contingency the contractor is allowed
to pay the back rent and take over the lease for the remainder of
the term, the contractor will ordinarily have no desire to become
a lessee of the premises, and the right will be of no value unless
he can find someone willing to pay him for the privilege of be-
coming an assignee of the lease.
It should also be pointed out that the fact that the lessee has
defaulted upon the rent due makes the rights of the contractor
less valuable even when he is able to sell the improvements to
satisfy his lien. The statute provides that the lessor is entitled
to payment of any claim for rent, which accrues until removal of
the improvements from the premises, out of the proceeds of the
sale of the improvements.6' Although the statute does not spe-
cifically provide that the lessor's claim for rent has priority over
that of the contractor for the cost of the improvements, it has
been interpreted as having that meaning.a2
CONCLUSION
In some instances, the mechanics' lien statute will provide
ample security to the contractor who installs improvements under
an agreement with the lessee. He may be able to assert a lien
upon the entire fee simple interest, in which case his remedy is
quite complete. In other cases, although unable to subject the
fee simple to a lien, he will have the right to remove substantial
improvements, the sale of which may completely satisfy his claim.
In any event, he will be entitled to the interest of the lessee or
licensee in the premises, but this right will frequently be of little
value to him.
WARREN R. MAICHEL
61. Mo. Rsv. STAT. § 429.070 (4) (1949).
62. Rogers Foundry Co. v. Squires, 221 Mo. App. 17, 297 S.W. 470 (1927).
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